Opiniatrety

Likesaying

I sometimes kick around the idea that in Davidson's famous analysis of indirect speech, we should replace the notion of samesaying with the notion of likesaying. That is, "X said that P" will be analyzed as "X said something that is like what I would say by the following: P."

There are a couple of motivations for this, but most prominent is the idea that our evaluations of indirect discourse reports aren't all or nothing. Take Cappelen and LePore's example (approximately): Joe says "At 11 pm I put on a green shirt, black pants, and blue shoes"; we, knowing that before 11 pm Joe was standing naked in front of an uncurtained window, say "Joe said that at 11 pm he stopped exposing himself to his neighbors."

Is what we say an accurate representation of what Joe says? I think the appropriate reaction is that it's somewhat accurate--accurate for some purposes and not for others. For instance, it wouldn't be accurate if our audience wanted to know whether Joe admitted that he had been exposing himself. And the reason for this, I think, is that when we say "At 11 pm he stopped exposing himself to his neighbors" what we say is in one respect like what Joe said when he said "At 11 pm I put on a green shirt, black pants, and blue shoes," but in another respect it's not like it. Whether the discourse report is acceptable depends in part on how close a likeness is demanded, and what kind.

(Howard Wettstein makes some similar points about how judgments on discourse reports aren't all or nothing in The Magic Prism; at least I remember them as similar. All mistakes mine, as usual.)

If this idea survives to the writing-up stage, I'm planning to ostentatiously refrain from citing as the use of "like" to introduce speech reports in support of it. But if we really want to know how the use of "like" as in "I'm like, no way" is like other uses of "like," it seems like there's a lot of actual linguistic research that seems liek it would be relevant. One, two, three relevant posts at Language Log. None of these, I think, deal with the use of "like" to introduce indirect discourse in Pogo-American (no attempt has been made to reproduce the original emphases):

Aug. 4, 1950: Owl: I jes' been chewin' up a watermelon an' got seeds in both ears---so I thought you say Albert swallied a butterfly---now, what is you did actual say, Pogo?

Pogo: I says again like I say before which was what you thought I said and I did.

and

Dec. 7, 1949--Albert the alligator and Uncle Antler the moose are staring eyeball to eyeball.

Antler: Jes' who's called me a cow, anyways, mister overgrown hoppy-toad?
Albert: I will tell you when you tell me who callin' me a overgrowed hoppy-toad what call a moo-cow like you a ol' hat-rack.
Antler: And I will tell you whom am I when you tell me who calls me all like you said but not 'fore you tells me who calls me what you say first is I who calls you what I said you be who calls me what you say last only I'm that way at you an' double do it!
[Silent panel.]
Albert [nonchalantly leaning against Antler and puffing his cigar]: I dare you--- jes--- say--- that--- a--- gain!

(And yes, the whole post was intended as a pretext for extended Pogo quotes rather than to put forth a serious philosophical thesis. That seems like a good use of this blog to me.)

Posted by Matt Weiner at November 19, 2004 11:11 AM